The last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in both the number and the market share of screen-based trading systems. Electronic trading systems do offer lower operating costs and the possibility of remote access to the market. On the other hand there are arguments based on the anonymity of electronic trading systems which suggest that adverse selection is a more severe problem in electronic trading systems and, therefore, the bid-ask spreads may be higher. The present paper addresses the issue of transaction costs in floor and computerized trading systems empirically. In Germany, floor and screen trading for the same stocks exist in parallel. Both markets are liquid and operate simultaneously for several hours each day.
Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in both the number and the market share of screen-based trading systems. The most recent example is the introduction of the SETS system in London. The issue of the relative merits of screen-based trading is, however, not yet settled. Electronic trading systems do offer lower operating costs and the possibility of remote access to the market. On the other hand there are arguments suggesting that adverse selection is a more severe problem in electronic trading systems and, therefore, the bid-ask spreads may be higher.
These arguments are based on the observation that most existing screen trading systems are anonymous. Market participants are therefore not able to identify information-induced orders.
Floor trading systems like the specialist systems of the NYSE and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, on the other hand, are less anonymous. The specialist may be able to identify informed trades ex ante or ex post. Ex-ante identification gives him the opportunity to offer less favorable prices to those traders that he considers to be informed. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and executing transactions initiated by uninformed counterparties at prices inside the quoted spread. Ex-post identification gives the specialist the opportunity to punish a counterparty by offering less favorable prices in future transactions (see BENVENISTE / MARCUS / WILHELM 1992). The specialist's sanctioning power may induce traders to at least partially reveal their information. This, in turn, decreases the degree of adverse information and may lead to a lower adverse selection component in effective bid-ask spreads.
The results of GARFINKEL / NIMALENDRAN (1995) support this view. They find that spreads on the NYSE are larger on insider trading days than on non-insider trading days. This is consistent with the specialists recognizing the presence of informed traders and adjusting their spreads accordingly.
The design of the present study has distinct advantages over the design of previous studies.
Data on bid and ask quotes from the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange was available.
Therefore, the potential bias resulting from using transaction prices instead of quotes is absent. The instruments (German blue chip stocks) traded on the floor and the screen trading system are identical. There is no potential for a home market bias because both markets are located in Germany. Finally, both markets are liquid and operate simultaneously for several hours each day.
The results support the hypothesis that adverse selection causes more severe problems in the electronic trading system. We find that the market share of the screen trading system is lower for less liquid stocks and that the market share is negatively related to return volatility.
Analyzing the level of quoted and effective spreads also reveals that the floor is more competitive the less liquid a stock. The result of a comparison of the level of the spreads partially depends on whether the Courtage -a commission which has to be paid on the flooris added to the floor spread. Finally, we document that spreads in the electronic trading system respond more heavily to increases in return volatility and that the adverse selection component of the spread is larger in the electronic system. 1 The results have important policy implications. Electronic trading systems are well suited for trading liquid stocks. For these stocks, the degree of asymmetric information is low and the higher operational efficiency of electronic trading systems outweighs any disadvantages associated with higher adverse selection costs. For illiquid stocks the reverse is true. Before replacing existing floor trading systems with electronic trading systems, the design of these computerized systems has to be improved. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. In 1 At first sight, our results stand in contrast to those of COPEJANS / DOMOWITZ (1997) . They find that the GLOBEX system performs well despite an illiquid environment. However, the futures contracts traded in GLOBEX are likely to be less affected by information asymmetry than the stocks analyzed in the present paper.
October 1998 Deutsche Börse AG dramatically increased the number of stocks that could be traded in the electronic trading system XETRA. However, in response to insufficient liquidity and large price deviations between XETRA and the floor (where the same stocks are traded) it was announced in January 1999 that a large number of stocks traded continuously thus far would be traded only in a single daily call auction in the future. Also in October 1998, Deutsche Börse AG has introduced Betreuer (banks which perform market making activities) into the XETRA trading system. It remains to be seen whether this measure is sufficient to improve the liquidity of the system for less liquid stocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the German stock market. Section 3 describes the data set. In section 4 we analyze the market share of the competing trading systems. Section 5 presents results on the degree of price clustering. In section 6 we compare the bid-ask spreads in the two trading systems and in section 7 we analyze the impact of adverse selection on the spread. Section 8 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our results.
The German stock market
The German stock market offers ideal conditions for a comparison of floor and screen trading systems. Since April 1991 an electronic open limit order book system (IBIS, Integriertes Börsenhandels-und Informations-System) operates parallel to the floor. The same stocks are traded on both systems and IBIS is in operation during the trading hours of the floor. IBIS has a significant market share. In our sample IBIS accounts for 55,1% of the trading volume. In the following a brief description of floor and screen trading is given. It documents the organization of stock trading in our sample period, June and July 1997. 
Data
The sample for the present study covers the 30 stocks which constitute the DAX index. These stocks are the most liquid German stocks and account for more than 80% of the total trading volume in domestic stocks. Trading is very concentrated even within this group of 30 stocks.
In 1997 the 10 [3] most heavily traded stocks alone accounted for 70% [25%] of the volume.
The sample period spans the 44 trading days in June and July 1997. Two days (July 21st and July 23rd) had to be removed from the sample. On both days heavy trading 7 caused a breakdown of the exchange's computer facilities. Trading had to be suspended several times.
The data from the screen trading system comprises time-stamped best-bid, best-ask and transaction prices, trading volume and volume at the best bid and best ask. The sample is restricted 6 An identified Makler order is only displayed as best bid or best offer when it improves on the limit prices of all other orders after inclusion of the Courtage.
to the three hours in which the floor and screen trading system operate parallel. When an identified quote is entered by a Makler, the bid or ask price is recorded net of Courtage. This is not true for the transaction prices. However, the change in the best bid or ask price (or in the quantity available at these prices) associated with a transaction allows to adjust the transaction prices for the Courtage.
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IBIS transaction and quote data stem from two different source data sets. The time-stamps of the trade and quote data were incompatible in some cases. Specifically, a transaction at the bid or ask price triggers a new quote because the bid or ask price and/or the quantity available at the best bid or ask change. In many cases the new quote was recorded earlier than the transaction that triggered the quote. 9 We corrected this by re-ordering the data. Making use of the fact that transactions at prices inside the spread are impossible and using the data on the quantities available at the bid and ask quotes, we were able to set up an algorithm which matches new quotes caused by a transaction with the respective transactions.
Data from the floor trading system comprises time-stamped transaction prices, volume data and the quotes entered by the Makler. Batched auction prices were removed from the data set because they do not have a counterpart in IBIS.
Summary statistics for the sample stocks are given in Table 1 .
Stock Characteristics and Market Share

7
The trading volume on both days was unparalleled in the history of the exchange.
8
There are exceptions to this general statement. As outlined above, some transactions occur at prices outside the quoted spread. In these cases the best bid and ask prices do not change when the transaction occurs. Therefore, it can not be inferred with certainty whether Courtage had to be paid on these trades. The resulting underestimation of the transaction costs in IBIS is immaterial, however, since transactions at prices outside the spread are very rare events.
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LEE / READY (1991) report that the same problem arises in NYSE data. There it is caused by the fact that trades and quotes are often recorded by different persons. It should be noted that in the present case the difference in the recorded time is usually only some hundredth of a second.
The simultaneity of floor and screen trading offers investors a choice of their preferred trading system. Rational investors will trade a specific stock on the trading system that they perceive to be best suited given the characteristics of the stock. Therefore, observed market shares of the competing systems contain information about the relative advantages of the systems as perceived by the investors.
Our basic hypothesis is that the anonymous screen trading system is more prown to adverse selection. Therefore, we expect the market share of the electronic system to be lower for stocks with a higher share of informed trading. Empirical evidence (EASLEY / KIEFER / O'HARA / PAPERMAN 1996 for the US and GRAMMIG / SCHIERECK / THEISSEN 1998 for the German market) suggests that the risk of trading with an informed trader is larger the less liquid a stock. Using the trading volume as a proxy for liquidity and return volatility as a measure of the information flow, we expect the following:
1. The market share of the anonymous electronic trading system for different stocks is positively related to the total trading volume.
2. The market share of the anonymous electronic trading system for different stocks is negatively related to the return volatility of the stocks.
We test these hypotheses by regressing the average IBIS market share on a measure of trading volume and a measure of volatility. We use the log of the number of transactions as a our measure of the trading volume. 10 Return volatility is measured as the percentage difference between the daily high and low transaction price:
10 JONES / KAUL / LIPSON (1994) present empirical evidence suggesting that the number of transactions rather than their size reveals the information implicit in volume data. We use the log of the number of transactions because a specification test (J-test, DAVIDSON / MACKINNON 1981) rejects the alternative of using the number of transactions. 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
where MA IBIS, i is the market share of IBIS for stock i, ln(Tr i ) is the natural log of the number of transactions for stock i and Vola i is the volatility measure for stock i as defined above, averaged over the 42 trading days. Both hypotheses are confirmed. The IBIS market share is higher the higher the total trading volume of the stock and the lower the return volatility.
The above model assumes that the IBIS market share is constant for a given stock. This neglects the time-series variability in the market share variable. Therefore we estimated a pooled time-series cross-section regression. The IBIS market share for stock i on trading day t was regressed on the log of the number of transactions on that day and the return volatility (measured as described above) of stock i on day t. The model accounts for different stock characteristics by including stock-specific dummy variables. The result is (n = 1260, heteroscedasticity-consistent t values in parantheses): The results again suggest that the market share of the electronic trading system is positively related to the total trading volume and negatively related to return volatility.
Our model specification assumes that the slope coefficients are identical for all stocks. To check the robustness of the results we re-estimated the model allowing for stock-specific slope coefficients. To account for contemporanous correlation of the error terms we estimated the 30 equations jointly using SUR. The market share of the electronic trading system is positively related to the log of the number of transactions for all 30 stocks; 29 of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level. For 25 stocks the estimated coefficient for the volatility measure is negative; 10 of these coefficients are significant at the 5% level. These results confirm our earlier findings. We conclude that, consistent with our hypotheses, the market share of the electronic trading system is positively related to the total trading volume and negatively related to return volatility.
Price Clustering
Market participants often use a set of prices which is coarser than that defined by the minimum tick size. This phenomenon is referred to as price clustering (HARRIS 1991) (1994) argue that the avoidance of odd-eight quotes is caused by implicit collusion.
In the present case the flow of new information is the same for the trading floor and IBIS because the systems operate parallel. Therefore, differences in the degree of price clustering can be traced back to either different negotiation costs or different degrees of market power (or collusion) and can thus be used to assess the quality of the two markets.
The simplest measure of price clustering is a comparison of the frequency of certain prices to the frequency with which they would occur in the absence of price clustering. Consider a stock with a minimum tick size of DM 0.01. In the absence of price clustering, 2% of the transaction prices should be whole or half numbers. If the actual frequency is higher, this is evidence of price clustering.
As our second measure of the degree of price clustering we use the relative entropy of the distribution of the transaction prices. The relative entropy is a dispersion measure for categorial variables. Its value is restricted to [0; 1]. It is calculated as follows. First, depending on the minimum tick size of a stock, a set of prices is defined. For a stock trading at a price below DM 100, the minimum tick size is DM 0.01 and the price set contains the 100
categories from DM yy.00 to yy.99. For stocks trading at prices above 100 the minimum tick size is DM 0.05 and the price set contains the 200 categories from DM y0.05 to y9.95. Some stocks were traded at prices both below and above 100 during the sample period. In these cases the data was split and the price clustering measures were calculated separately for the transaction prices below and above 100.
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In the next step, the frequencies n i with which prices fall in the k different categories are calculated. Finally, the relative entropy is obtained as 11 We required a minimum of 250 observations. When the actual number was lower (e.g. only 180 transaction prices below 100 on the floor) the case was excluded from the sample. 12 I thank Karl Hermann Fischer for suggesting this measure.
where all variables are defined as above. Like the relative entropy this measure takes on the value 1 for a uniform distribution (no clustering) and the value 0 for a one-point distribution (complete clustering). Table 2 contains the results. Table 2a [Table 2b ] reports the results for stocks trading at prices below [above] 100. The first four columns report the frequencies with which specified sets of prices are observed. For example, the first column in Table 2a reports the frequency of prices ending on whole and halve numbers. In the absence of clustering we would expect 2% of all transaction prices to fall into this category.
It is evident that price clustering exists in both markets. The observed frequencies are higher than the predicted frequencies in each case. The table also reports the χ 2 -statistic testing the null hypothesis that the actual frequencies are drawn from a uniform distribution. Under the null hypothesis this statistic is distributed χ 2 with k -1 degrees of freedom, resulting in a critical value of 69.2 at the 1% level for k = 100 and 155.5 for k= 200. The null of a uniform distribution is strongly rejected in each case.
With only very few exceptions the degree of clustering is higher on the floor than in the electronic trading system. Consider, for example, the whole and half number frequencies shown in Table 2a . For 14 of the 15 stocks, the frequency of prices ending on whole and half numbers is higher on the floor. The relative entropy and the St measure tell a similar story.
They indicate a higher degree of price clustering on the floor for all stocks. Therefore, our results imply that IBIS is the superior trading system for the sample stocks. For reasons to be explained below we will come back to this point and discuss the suitability of the degree of price clustering as a measure of market quality.
Quoted and Effective Spreads
The bid-ask spread is a direct measure of the transaction costs borne by the investors. It has, therefore, widely been used in order to assess the quality of a Transactions at prices outside the spread do occur but are too rare to materially affect the effective spread. Therefore, current and effective spread are almost identical. Table 3 reports the results for all three spread measures. Stocks are sorted by total trading volume in descending order. As outlined in section 2, investors have to pay the Courtage when transacting on the floor. The regular rate amounts to 0.04% of the transaction volume; the reduced rate for floor brokers amounts to 0.006%. Therefore, the bid-ask spreads for the floor have to be augmented by 0.08% from the point of view of a retail investor.
The results in Table 3 show that the quoted spread on the floor and in IBIS are similar on average. The average quoted spread on the floor is 0.316% as compared to 0.326% in IBIS.
Spreads on the floor are lower for 15 of the 30 stocks. There is a tendency for spreads on the floor to be lower than the IBIS spreads for stocks with a lower total trading volume. This is consistent with the results on market share discussed in section 4.
The picture becomes less favorable for the floor when the Courtage is added to the spread.
After adding twice the regular rate, spreads on the floor are higher than the IBIS spreads for 27 of the 30 stocks.
The current spread on the floor is slightly lower than the average quoted spread (0.288% as compared to 0.316%). Thus, at the moment a transaction occurs the spread is, on average, 0.028% lower than it is on average. This difference can be interpreted as the benefit to the timing of transactions. This benefit is more pronounced in IBIS. Here, the difference between quoted and current spread amounts to 0.08%. One possible explanation rests on the quotation behavior of the Makler. The midquote is almost always a round fraction. Given this, the fact that many transactions occur at a price equalling the midquote leads to a high degree of clustering while the effective spread for the transactions in question is zero.
The very small minimum tick size provides a second potential explanation. The minimum tick size is largest for a stock trading at prices slightly above 100. 15 However, even in this extreme case the tick size of DM 0.05 represents only 0.05% of the share value. Investors can therefore gain priority in the open limit order book by bettering the standing quotes at a very low cost.
This reduces the degree of price clustering but does not substantially reduce the spread.
Adverse selection costs
The hypothesis that the floor is relatively more attractive for less liquid stocks rests on the assumption that the non-anonymous trading system on the floor is better suited to cope with 13 Quotation data for these stocks is not available. The stocks have been selected by size. The sample includes every fifth of the 70 MDAX stocks. It should be noted that, although the 14 stocks are clearly less liquid than the DAX stocks in the main sample, they still belong to the 100 most liquid stocks in Germany. 14 Only transactions in the continuous trading session were considered. The call auctions were excluded because they do not have a counterpart in IBIS. 15 A higher minimum tick size would obtain for a stock trading at prices below DM 20. Our sample does not contain such low-priced stocks.
adverse selection problems. Two testable implications can be derived from this assumption.
First, the increase in the bid-ask spread associated with an increase in the degree of information asymmetry should be more pronounced in IBIS than on the floor. Second, the adverse selection component of the spread should be larger in IBIS.
The volatility of returns can be used as a proxy for the amount of private information (see e.g.
FRENCH / ROLL 1986). Periods of higher volatility are thus characterized by a higher degree of information asymmetry and should, therefore, be associated with higher bid-ask spreads. We expect this increase to be more pronounced in the electronic trading system. To test this hypothesis we proceed as follows. We calculate the return volatility (as defined in section 4) and the bid ask spread for both markets and for each trading day. We then estimate the
where s i t q , is the quoted spread on day t for stock i, D IBIS is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the observation is from the electronic trading system, and Vola i,t is the volatility measure. Spreads for the floor have been augmented by twice the regular Courtage rate. We have 84 observations for each stock; one observation for each of the 42 trading days and for each market. The regression allows for market-specific intercept terms to account for the different spread levels documented in section 6. Our primary interest is in the coefficient δ i which measures the difference in the slope coefficients for the two markets. Our hypothesis implies δ i > 0. The error terms for the 30 stocks in the sample are likely to be contemporanously correlated. Therefore, we estimated the 30 equations jointly using SUR.
We estimated a similar model using the effective spread rather than the quoted spread as the dependent variable: 
The results for both sets of regressions are summarized in Table 4 (1996) . There are, however, two differences.
First, we match buyer-initiated transactions with subsequent seller-initiated transactions and vice versa whereas HUANG / STOLL only categorize the initial transaction and match it with a subsequent transaction that may be either buyer-or seller-initiated. Our approach explicitly recognizes the fact that a supplier of immediacy can close a position only by a transaction at the opposite side of the market. In HUANG / STOLL this is recognized implicitly because their measure is interpreted as the realized half-spread. If transactions at the bid and at the ask are equally likely, both measures have the same expected value. The second difference may lower his quotes in order to attract buy orders (HO / STOLL 1981) . This quote revision also reduces his earnings. The difference between effective and realized spread thus measures the sum of the adverse selection and the inventory holding cost component of the spread.
Inventory considerations shoul be of much greater importance on the floor where the liquidity is, to a large extent, supplied by a single person, the Makler. Therefore, the measure described above overestimates the relative importance of adverse selection costs on the floor.
Results are presented in Table 5 . Realized spreads are almost identical on the floor and in IBIS (average 0.0158% on the floor and 0.0117% in IBIS; the difference is not significant).
For some stocks (8 on the floor, 10 in IBIS) the realized spread is negative. This already indicates that losses to better informed traders are economically significant.
Our estimate of the adverse selection component averages 0.181% on the floor and 0.234% in IBIS. The difference between these two averages is significant at the 10% level using a t-test is that we match each transaction with the next transaction whereas HUANG / STOLL use the first transaction after a specified amount of time. They find that results for different time horizons are very similar.
Two remarks are in order. First, as outlined above, our measure of the adverse selection component includes the inventory holding costs to the extent that inventory management reduces the spread realized by the suppliers of liquidity. However, since inventory management should be much more important on the floor than in IBIS, explicitly including inventory management considerations would strengthen our result of lower adverse selection costs on the floor.
Second, the validity of the proposed measure of the adverse selection component should be checked.
18 Figure 2 presents the estimated adverse selection component for both markets.
Although the trading systems differ significantly, the estimates of the adverse selection component are surprisingly similar. The correlation is 0.882, highly significant at conventional levels. This finding suggests that our results are not an artefact of the procedure used.
To summarize, our results on the response of the spread to increased volatility and our measure of the adverse selection component support the hypothesis that the non-anonymous trading system on the floor is better suited to cope with adverse selection problems.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we compare the transaction costs on the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange to the transaction costs in the electronic trading system IBIS. The German stock market offers an ideal environment for this kind of analysis because identical stocks are traded simultaneously on both systems for several hours each day.
Our main hypotheses state that the screen trading system offers higher operational efficiency but, on the other hand, is likely to be more prown to adverse selection problems.
18 Such a check is useful because different methods to estimate the adverse selection component have proven to yield different results.
An analysis of the market share of the competing trading systems confirms this view. The market share of IBIS is an increasing function of the total trading volume and a decreasing function of return volatility. Given that the degree of asymmetric information is likely to be larger for smaller firms and assuming that volatility is a valid proxy for the information flow, these results are consistent with our hypotheses.
The results of a comparison of quoted and effective bid-ask spreads depend on whether the
Courtage -a commission which has to be paid on the floor but not in IBIS -is added to the floor spread or not. Irrespective of this ambiguity, we find that the floor becomes relatively more competitive the less liquid the stock in question. This is again consistent with our hypothesis.
We measure the reaction of quoted and effective spreads to increases in volatility and find that quoted spreads in IBIS depict a stronger increase than quoted spreads on the floor. Results for the effective spreads are less clear but point in the same direction. Finally, we show that the adverse selection component of the spread is smaller on the floor.
The results have important implications for the design and use of electronic trading systems in practice. Electronic trading systems are well suited for trading liquid stocks. For these stocks, the degree of asymmetric information is low and the higher operational efficiency of electronic trading systems outweighs any disadvantages associated with higher adverse selection costs. For illiquid stocks the reverse is true. Before replacing existing floor trading systems with electronic trading systems, the design of these computerized systems should be improved. It is not clear, however, how this can be achieved. The anonymity of the trading system has been identified as being at the heart of the problem. One important point to note is that electronic trading systems are inherently anonymous in a certain sense. It is of course possible (and practiced on some exchanges) to display broker identifications on the screen.
This does not solve the problem, however, because now the supplier of liquidity is known whereas those who demand liquidity by accepting displayed orders are still anonymous. If, as is hypothesized in the present paper, the advantage of the floor lies in the fact that the Makler (or specialist) is able to identify those who demand liquidity, then it will be difficult for electronic trading systems to come up with a solution for the problem of trader anonymity.
Deutsche Börse AG has started an interesting experiment when introducing Betreuer (banks which perform market making activities) into their XETRA system in October 1998. Future research should address the question whether this measure is sufficient to improve the liquidity of the system for less liquid stocks. Table 2a presents results on price clustering for stocks trading at prices below 100. Columns 2 -5 report the frequencies with which the sets of prices specified in the first line are observed. The frequency with which they would be observed in the absence of price clustering are given in parantheses. Column 6 reports the χ 2 statistic for a test of the null hypothesis that the observed frequencies are drawn from a discrete uniform distribution. The critical value at the 1% level is 69.2 (99 df). The last two columns report the relative entropy and the St measure developed by VOGEL (1994 
where s i t , is the quoted spread (panel A) or the effective spread (panel B) on day t for stock i, D IBIS is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the observation is from the electronic trading system, and Vola i,t is the volatility measure. Spreads for the floor have been augmented by twice the regular Courtage rate. The regression is run for a total of 84 observations for each stock; one observation for each of the 42 trading days and for each market. The 30 equations were estimated jointly using SUR. The first line in both panels reports the median value of the estimated parameters. The two remaining lines report the number of positive and negative slope coefficients. Our primary interest is in the coefficient δ i which measures the difference in the slope coefficients for the two markets. Our hypothesis implies δ i > 0. 
